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Abstract
According to many philosophers, many utterances of sentences contain unarticulated
indexical expressions. In response to the problem of incompleteness, for instance, many
Russellians hold that definite descriptions contain unarticulated indexical expressions
which restrict the denotation of the description’s nominal. I argue that such unarticulated
indexical expressions pose a problem for Griceans who wish to explain meaning in terms of
speakers communicative intentions. Roughly, the problem is that if there are unarticulated
indexical expressions, then speakers can’t rationally intend to have their audience entertain
a single complete proposition by their utterance of a sentence.
Following Buchanan (2010), I suggest that the only way for the Gricean to meet
this problem is to argue that often restricted proposition-types (and not propositions) are
the objects of speakers communicative intentions. In particular, I argue that restricted
proposition-types should be understood as proposition-types restricted by speakers’ act-
coordinating intentions. In uttering a sentence speakers intend their audience to entertain
any token proposition of their communicatively intended proposition-type; furthermore,
speakers intend that the proposition the audience entertains by means of their utterance
disposes them to act in coordination with the speakers intended action.
1 Introduction
According to Russellians, definite articles (e.g. the determiner ‘the’ in English) semantically
express existence and uniqueness of their nominals. So, for instance, for ‘the beer is cold’ to be
true, according to Russellians, it must be the case that (among other things) ‘beer’ denotes a
set with at least one member and at most one member (i.e. a singleton set). Since there are
many cases in which speakers can intuitively say something true by uttering a sentence con-
taining a description, although the description’s nominal doesn’t seem to denote a singleton
set (Strawson 1950, 332), many Russellians suggest that often a description’s nominal contains
a hidden indexical element such that in context the nominal denotes a singleton set. So, for
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instance, although {x : x is beer} isn’t a singleton set, Russellains argue that ‘the beer is cold’
can be true in context since the set denoted by the description’s nominal is the intersection of
{x : x is beer} and a set denoted by an unarticulateed indexical expression. The intersection of
these two sets is a singleton set.
I will argue that the above Russellian-indexical account of descriptions is problematic for
Griceans. In many contexts there will be too many potential values the nominal’s hidden in-
dexical element might be thought of as referring to and hence it’s hard to see how a speaker’s
communicative intention should fix the indexical element’s value in context. I will further argue
that the best way for the Gricean Russellian to meet this difficulty—known as the multiple-
candidate problem—is to argue that sometimes the object of a speaker’s communicative inten-
tion is a restricted proposition-type (and not a proposition). A restricted proposition-type, is a
proposition-type restricted by the speaker’s act-coordinating-intention.
The plan for this essay is as follows. In §2 and §3, I outline Gricean semantics and Russell’s
theory of descriptions. In §4 I present the multiple-candidate problem and in §5 I argue that
this problem shows that speakers can’t mean single complete propositions by their utterances of
sentences containing incomplete descriptions. In §6, I endorse Buchanan’s suggestion that the
objects of speakers communicative intentions are restricted proposition-types. In §7, I try to make
sense of what a restricted proposition-type is; I argue that it’s a proposition-type restricted by a
speaker’s act-coordinating intention.
2 Gricean Semantics
According to Gricean semantics the fundamental notion of meaning is speaker-meaning.
Speaker-meaning is what a speaker means by his utterance on an occasion of use. Speaker-
meaning (for indicative speech) is metaphysically determined by the speaker’s communicative
intention that his audience entertains the proposition the speaker has in mind via the speaker’s
utterance. Roughly, a necessary and sufficient condition for (indicative) speaker-meaning is
that the speaker has the following reflexive communicative intention (Grice 1989, 110):
(Speaker-meaning) Speaker S means proposition p iff in uttering u S intends:
(1) his audience, A, to entertain that p;
(2) A to recognise S ’s intention (1);
(3) A to recognise (1) by means of recognition of (2).
So, for my utterance ‘Beer is nice’ to mean Beer is nice, it’s necessary that I intend my audi-
ence to entertain this proposition and that I intend my audience to recognise my intention by
recognising that this is what I communicatively intend by my utterance. What’s required for
communicative success is that my audience entertains exactly this proposition and recognises that
I intend them to entertain this proposition by my utterance.
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Now, according to Griceans, regular speaker-meaning metaphysically determines timeless
meaning (Grice 1989, 91). Timeless meaning is a word’s or sentence’s conventional meaning.
So, for instance, the fact that speakers in a linguistic community regularly utter ‘Beer is nice’ to
mean Beer is nice gives rise to something like a convention that ‘Beer is nice’ means Beer is nice.
Timeless-meaning isn’t something like the content of an assertion or inscription1. Rather,
according to Griceans, it’s similar to an instruction or constraint to speaker-meaning: it tells
speakers what types of propositions they can rationally intend to induce in their audience by a
literal utterance of a sentence and it guides the audience in interpreting which proposition the
speaker might literally mean by his utterance.
How does timeless-meaning constrain speaker-meaning? According to Griceans, it’s a fact
about human agency that speakers can only intend what they believe to be possible (Grice 1989,
98). Call this principle Grice’s principle. Now, if speakers adhere to this principle, then they
can’t ordinarily use (say) the utterance ‘Beer is nice’ to mean Wine is nice because they don’t
believe it’s possible for their audience to work out their intended meaning by exploiting the
timeless-meaning of ‘Beer is nice’2. Hence, a sentence’s timeless-meaning constrains speaker-
meaning by constraining what propositions speakers can rationally intend to communicate by
their utterances.
How should ‘possibility’ be understood in the above formulation of Grice’s principle? I
suggest, following Buchanan, that for S to mean p by uttering u, S must expect it reasonable
that A is capable of working out S ’s intended meaning from S ’s utterance (Buchanan 2010,
350). This formulation is admittedly vague, yet I think some precisification of Grice’s principle
along the lines of what it’s reasonable for speakers to expect should be right. ‘Possibility’ can’t
be understood as physical or logical possibility because then the constraint on communicative
intentions will be too weak such that Gricean semantics collapses into humpty-dumptyism—
the view that you can use words to mean whatever you want them to. ‘Possibility’, however, also
can’t be understood as ‘being very likely’ because then the constraint on intentions will be too
strong such that speakers can’t use sentences non-literally to conversationally implicate.
3 Russell’sTheory of Descriptions
According to Russell’s theory of descriptions, definite articles (and possessive determiners such
as ‘my’ or ‘her’) semantically express existence and uniqueness of their nominals (Russell 1905,
481). So for a sentence of the form ‘The F is G’ to be true, the description’s nominal, ‘F’,
must denote a set with at least one member and at most one member (i.e. a singleton set).
Furthermore, this singleton set must be a subset of the set denoted by the VP ‘is G’. A problem
for Russell’s theory, known as the problem of incompleteness (Strawson 1950, 332), is that
1. Griceans follow Strawson (Strawson 1950, 326) in maintaining that sentences don’t express propositions;
speakers use sentences to express propositions. See Neale (2004, 151).
2. There might of course be special contexts in which S can conversationally implicate Wine is nice by uttering
‘Beer is nice’.
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there are many cases in which speakers can intuitively say something true in uttering a sentence
containing a description, although the description’s nominal doesn’t seem to denote a singleton
set. Consider, for instance, Stephen telling Anita ‘The beer is cold’ at a philosophy conference.
Intuitively, Stephen can say something true by this sentence if there’s a single cold beer in the
vicinity on the occasion of utterance3. According to Russell’s theory, however, Stephen will
almost trivially say something false because ‘beer’ doesn’t denote a singleton set—there’s more
than one beer in the universe.
One popular response to this problem is to argue that the set denoted by ‘beer’ is restricted
to a singleton set in context4. Stanley, for instance, suggests that for sentences such as the above,
the description’s nominal co-habits a node with a hidden indexical expressionH5 which denotes
a contextually-salient set such that the sentence’s logical form is as follows (Stanley 2002, 9):
S<t>
DP<et,t>
[The]<et,et,t> NP<e,t>
{[beer]∩[H]}<e,t>
VP<e,t>
[is cold]<e,t>
If the set of beers is intersected with the set denoted by H such that {beer ∩H} denotes a
singleton set, then Russell’s theory predicts that ‘The beer is cold’ can be true in context although
there are more than one beer in the universe.
4 Gricean Russellianism and theMultiple-Candidate Problem
A problem with Stanley’s proposal is that there must be some explanation of how H’s value
is determined in context. For Gricean Russellians this explanation must be couched in
intention-based terms. In particular, a Gricean will want to say that in uttering ‘The beer
is cold’ the speaker communicatively intends his audience to entertain a complete proposition
3. ‘The beer is cold’ also has a generic-reading in which ‘the beer’ refers to a particular kind of beer (e.g. a
particular brand or the set of beers at the conference). On this reading there needn’t be a single cold beer in the
vicinity on the occasion of utterance for ‘the beer is cold’ to be true. I will ignore generic definite descriptions in
the confines of this essay. Ultimately, although I can’t argue for it here, I think the problem I present in §3 also
arises for generic-readings. See Carlson (1977) for a discussion of generic descriptions.
4. A different response is to say that ‘The beer is cold’ semantically expresses a false proposition, however, com-
municates (i.e. conversationally implicates) a true proposition (Blackburn 1984, 308–310). I won’t have anything
to say about this pragmatic strategy, although I think ultimately it gives rise to the same problem presented in §3.
5. Stanley’s proposal is in fact more complex. According to him H is itself composed of f , a contextually-
sensitive function from objects to sets, and i, a contextually-sensitive object f takes as argument to yield the
restricting set. For purpose of this essay, I will ignore the nuances of Stanley’s view.
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∃!x(x is {beer ∩H} ∧ x is cold) 6, where H is a particular restricting set (e.g. {in this fridge})
which is a constituent of the speaker’s communicatively intended proposition.
Now, Stanley’s proposal raises a problem for Gricean Russellians—the multiple-candidate
problem—because it seems implausible to think that in uttering ‘The beer is cold’ at the confer-
ence Stephen can have a complete proposition (with a definite value for H) in mind which he
intends to communicate by his utterance (Schiffer 1995, 114–15).
That’s because, as noted above, speakers can only intend what they believe to be possible. In
the above example, however, there are many contextually-salient candidate propositions (corres-
ponding to different values forH) which Stephen knows that Anita might reasonably interpret
him as expressing by his utterance. For instance:
(1) ∃!x(x is {beer ∩ you like} ∧ x is cold)
(2) ∃!x(x is {beer ∩ from this corner shop} ∧ x is cold)
(3) ∃!x(x is {beer ∩ for you} ∧ x is cold)
(4) ∃!x(x is {beer ∩ at this conference} ∧ x is cold)
(5) ∃!x(x is {beer ∩ in this fridge} ∧ x is cold)
(6) ∃!x(x is {beer ∩ on the top shelf of this fridge} ∧ x is cold)
(...) 7 8
Given the sheer amount of candidate propositions in context, Stephen knows that he can’t
reasonably expect Anita to work out any proposition of (1)-(6) in particular by his utterance.
Hence, he can’t mean a definite proposition—say (1)—by ‘the beer is cold’ without violating
Grice’s principle. Communicative success wouldn’t be a matter of chance or luck, but something
close to a miracle. Ipso facto, Gricean semantics, according to which the objects of speaker’s
intentions are definite propositions, is flawed9; speakers can’t always intend to communicate
definite propositions by their utterances.
6. This representation of the logical form of ‘the beer is cold’ is a bit inaccurate. It would be more precise to
represent it as ∃!x(x is {beer ∩ H}) ∧ ∃y( y is {beer ∩ H} ∧ y is cold) . To avoid an excessively complicated
presentation, I will ignore this matter in what follows.
7. The list of propositions the speaker could be understood as meaning in the above context could I think
potentially go on indefinitely.
8. The anonymous reviewer and Kimon Sourlas-Kotzamanis note, that my description of the party scenario is
somewhat underdescribed and that if we were to flesh out the situation and context, the list of potential can- didate
propositions Stephen might be understood as meaning will be significantly smaller. I agree with them that fleshing
out the context will reduce the list of potential candidate propositions. Yet it seems to me that even if we were to
fully elaborate the context, the list of potential candidate propositions would still be far too large for Stephen to
mean one definite proposition in particular.
9. One might think that this problem refutes Russell’s theory of descriptions, rather than Gricean semantics.
I disagree. The multiple-candidate problem arises for many constructions besides definite descriptions. For
instance, for non-sentential assertions such as ‘Tiger!’ (uttered when a tiger is coming) the explicit linguistic
material also underdetermines the proposition expressed, such that prima facie speakers can’t mean a single complete
proposition by their utterance. This suggests that the multiple-candidate problem undermines Gricean semantics,
rather than the theory of descriptions.
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5 Gricean Replies to theMultiple-Candidate Problem
If the Gricean picture of communication is to be maintained, we must find a proposition cor-
responding to ‘the beer is cold’ the speaker can mean and the audience must have entertained
for communication to be successful.
(A) One suggestion is to maintain that in contexts such as the above—contexts in which
there are prima facie too many description completions—there’s something like a convention
that speakers usuallymean object-dependent propositions by their utterances. FollowingNeale’s
Russell-friendly account of referential uses of descriptions (Neale 2004, 171), we could then
maintain that in uttering ‘the beer is cold’ Stephen communicatively intends Anita to entertain
∃!x(x is {beer ∩ x = o} ∧ x is cold) , where o is a particular beer (the object of the propos-
ition) which is the object of Stephen’s communicatively intended proposition. If there’s such
a convention of usage, then Stephen can mean a definite object-dependent proposition by his
utterance without violating Grice’s principle—there’s only one candidate proposition salient in
context.
The main problem with this suggestion is that it lacks generality (Bowker 2017, 7). Prima
facie, there are many cases for which the multiple-candidate problem arises where we can’t plaus-
ibly say that the speaker meant an object-dependent proposition by his utterance.
Consider, for instance, Stephen and Anita on their way to the conference. Now, imagine
Stephen uttering ‘the beer, whichever it is, is cold’. In that case, there will be multiple pro-
positions ‘the beer, whichever it is, is cold’ could express in context. Intuitively, however, none
of them will be object-dependent propositions because prima facie Stephen is making a general
statement about whatever it is which has the property ‘beer’. This example suggests that the
above response to the multiple-candidate problem is at best incomplete.
(B) Another similar response by Michaelson is to suggest that for sentences containing in-
complete descriptions there’s something like a convention that speakers usually mean proposi-
tions in whichH refers to the speaker’s de dictomental state (Michaelson 2016, 13). So, in utter-
ing ‘The beer is cold’, it’s standard usage that Stephen will mean the proposition ∃!x(x is {beer∩
in the speaker’s mind}∧x is cold) . If that’s the case, then Stephen can mean a definite propos-
ition by his utterance of ‘the beer is cold’ without violating Grice’s principle—∃!x(x is {beer ∩
in the speaker’s mind}∧x is cold) is the only proposition salient in context. A nice thing about
Michaelson’s suggestion is that, unlike Neale’s, it doesn’t only meet themultiple-candidate prob-
lem for object-dependent propositions.
The problem with Michaelson’s response10 is that it leads to humpty-dumptyism and hence
should be unappealing to Griceans. Consider, for instance, Stephen at the conference. For
what ever reason he wants to communicate to Anita the propositionThe beer which is in the safe
in Kripke’s office is cold and produces ‘The beer is cold’. Can Stephen mean this proposition by
10. I don’t mean to imply that Michaelson thinks that (B) is a satisfactory response to the multiple-candidate
problem. In fact in personal correspondence he agreed with me that (B) isn’t a viable response because it collapses
into humpty-dumptyism.
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his utterance without violating Grice’s principle? According to Michaelson’s suggestion we’d
have to say yes, since Stephen has the proposition involving Kripke’s safe in mind. Hence,
Anita should be able to identify this proposition in a semi-opaque manner via Stephen’s de dicto
mental state.
This seems implausible. If Stephen can mean The beer which is in the safe in Kripke’s office is
cold by his utterance, then there’s a real danger that Stephen can mean any proposition of the
form ∃!x(x is {beer∩H}∧x is cold) so long as he intends Anita to identify the value forH via
his de dicto mental state. I take it, therefore, that Michaelson’s suggestion isn’t a viable response
for Griceans.
6 Buchanan’s Solution to theMultiple-Candidate Problem
Although I can’t claim to have considered all responses to the multiple-candidate problem, I
think the Gricean picture of communication can’t be maintained as it is.
One helpful suggestion made by Buchanan, in response to this problem, is to say that some-
times the object of a speaker’s communicative intention is a restricted proposition-type (and not
a proposition) and that communicative success merely requires the audience to entertain at
least one proposition which is a token of the speaker’s communicatively intended restricted
proposition- type (Buchanan 2010, 358–59).
A proposition-type is the property common to all propositions which a sentence with a dis-
crete logical form can be used to express in different contexts. So, for instance, the proposition-
type for ‘The beer is cold’ is ∃!x(x is {beer∩_}∧x is cold) , where ‘_’ is a gap to be completed by
different values corresponding to different token propositions this sentence can express in dif-
ferent contexts. Propositions (1)-(6) are all tokens of the type ∃!x(x is {beer∩ _} ∧ x is cold) .
A restricted proposition-type is a proposition-type for which the value of ‘_’ has been re-
stricted in context by the speaker’s preferences. So, for instance, for ‘The beer is cold’ at the
conference, the value of ‘_’ might be restricted such that (1) is a token of the speaker’s restricted
proposition-type, but not (say) ∃!x(x is {beer ∩ belongs to George Bush} ∧ x is cold) .
Now if Buchanan’s account of speaker-meaning is correct, then Stephen doesn’t violate
Grice’s principle when he utters ‘The beer is cold’ at the conference: it’s perfectly reasonable
for him to have the expectation that Anita works out at least one proposition which is a token
of his restricted proposition-type. If Anita interprets Stephen as meaning ∃!x(x is {beer ∩
at the conference} ∧ x is cold) , but not the other tokens—say (2)-(6)—of Stephen’s restricted
proposition-type, then this is sufficient for her to understand Stephen and for communication
to be successful. Hence, the multiple-candidate problem is overcome.
A problem with Buchanan’s proposal is that he leaves a few things unexplained. According
to Griceans, as noted in §2, successful communication consists in A entertaining proposition p
and recognising that S intends them to entertain p via recognition of this intention. Now, if on
Buchanan’s picture A merely needs to entertain a token proposition of S ’s restricted proposition-
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type, then presumably successful communication needn’t consist in A fully recognising S ’s com-
municative intention to have A entertain a token of his restricted proposition-type (Bowker
2017, 8). Hence, Buchanan will still have to work out the details a watered down version of
speaker-meaning which presumably only involves S having the intention thatA partially recog-
nises the speaker’s communicative intention by his utterance.
Another general concern, that I intend to address in the rest of this essay, is that Buchanan
says very little about what restricts the speaker’s proposition-type. One might think, following
Michaelson, that a restricted proposition-type just is a cluster of propositions the speaker has in
mind ; each proposition of this cluster is a proposition the speaker has a representation of and is
happy to be understood as meaning by his utterance11.
This simple suggestion, however, won’t do. To see this, consider again Stephen uttering ‘the
beer is cold’ in order to inform Anita that they might drink beer after the conference. Further-
more, assume that the conference is held in a bungalow. Lastly, assume that for whatever reason
Stephen doesn’t possess the concept ‘bungalow’. Since Stephen doesn’t possess this concept, it
seems that if a restricted proposition-type is a certain cluster of propositions the speaker has in
mind, then ∃!x(x is {beer ∩ in the bungalow} ∧ x is cold) won’t be a token of Stephen’s re-
stricted proposition-type. Now, assume that for whatever reason Anita interprets Stephen as
meaning ∃!x(x is {beer ∩ in the bungalow} ∧ x is cold) by his utterance.
Is communication successful? According to Michaelson’s interpretation of restricted
proposition-types communication can’t be successful, since the proposition Anita entertains
by Stephen’s utterance is a proposition Stephen doesn’t have the concepts to represent; Anita’s
proposition, therefore, can’t be a token of Stephen’s restricted proposition-type.
This seems implausible. It’s intuitive to think that communication may still be successful in
the above scenario, so long as Anita grasps a proposition of type ∃!x(x is {beer∩_}∧x is cold)
and knows from Stephen’s utterance that she might drink beer with Stephen after the confer-
ence. Life will go on perfectly well: Stephen won’t notice that Anita entertained a proposition
he doesn’t have the concepts to represent and after the conference they might both have beer
together which seems to be the main purpose of Stephen’s communicative act. This suggests
that Michaelson’s interpretation of restricted proposition-types can’t be right; communicative
success doesn’t require there to be an overlap in the propositions speaker and audience have in
mind12.
7 Proposition-types restricted by Act-Coordinating Intentions
Following Paul (1999, 158), I maintain that (at least in part) communication is a means of co-
ordinating actions between speaker and audience; speakers utter words or sentences in conver-
sational contexts with higher-order intentions to coordinate their actions with their audience’s.
11. Michaelson (2016, 13) seems to assume this interpretation when he says that according to Buchanan ‘[speak-
ers have a] cluster of propositions [...] in mind [they intend] to convey’.
12. This argument is indebted to Michaelson (24)
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Call these higher-order intentions act-coordinating-intentions. So, for instance, when Stephen
utters ‘the beer is cold’ we might think of him as having the act-coordinating intention that, as
the result of his utterance, Anita is disposed to act in coordination with his intended action13 of
(say) potentially drinking beer with her after the conference.
Now, to provide an improved account of restricted proposition-types which meets the above
difficulty with Michaelson’s interpretation, I suggest that for utterances of sentences with in-
complete descriptions speakers communicatively intend their audience to entertain at least one
proposition of their intended proposition-type. What restricts this proposition-type is the
speaker’s act-coordinating-intention; speakers intend their audience to entertain any propos-
ition of their proposition-type the entertainment of which disposes the audience to act in co-
ordination with the speaker’s intended action14. So, for instance, when Stephen utters ‘the beer
is cold’, then he intends Anita to entertain at least one proposition of the type ∃!x(x is {beer∩
_} ∧ x is cold) . He also intends—this is what restricts the proposition-type—that the pro-
position Anita entertains is a proposition the entertainment of which disposes her to act in
coordination with Stephen’s intended action of (say) potentially drinking beer with her after
the conference15.
How can the entertainment of a proposition dispose the audience to act in coordination
with the speaker’s intended action? I suggest that the entertainment of a proposition can supply
the audience with sufficient information such that they’re able to infer the speaker’s intended
action. Knowing the speaker’s intended action (via this inference) is to have a disposition to
act in coordination with it. So, for instance, if Stephen utters ‘the beer is cold’ and Anita
thereby entertains the proposition ∃!x(x is {beer ∩ in this fridge} ∧ x is cold) , then she can
use this proposition to infer Stephen’s intended action. Since she believes that Stephen meant
∃!x(x is {beer ∩ in this fridge} ∧ x is cold) , she can reason that he probably intends to drink
a beer with her after the conference—why else would Stephen mean the above proposition at
the conference? Hence, she’ll have a disposition to act in coordination with Stephen’s intended
action.
If act-coordinating intentions restrict proposition-types, then communication will presum-
ably succeed in the conference scenario if Anita entertains ∃!x(x is {beer ∩ in this fridge} ∧
x is cold) , but not if she entertains ∃!x(x is {beer ∩ belongs to George Bush} ∧ x is cold) by
13. The object of a speaker’s act-coordinating intention may also be an intended inaction. This leaves it open
whether omitting to do something is an action.
14. I suggest that act-coordinating intentions are reflexive just like ordinary Gricean communicative intentions.
For S to have the intention that A be disposed to act in coordination with S ’s intended action, it’s prima facie
necessary thatS also intends thatA recognisesS ’s act-coordinating intention. If there’s no such recognition involved,
it’s hard to see how A’s actions should properly be coordinated with S ’s actions.
15. Sourlas-Kotzamanis notes that act-coordinating intentions might also help to explain Grice’s maxim of re-
lation to be relevant to the communicative purpose. The idea might be that speakers (tacitly) agree on some act-
coordinating goal in a communicative exchange and that the maxim of relation states that speakers should make
conversational contributions which are relevant to this shared act-coordinating goal. I am sympathetic to this
suggestion. Grice himself is rather reluctant in ‘Logic and Conversation’ to satisfactorily explicate the maxim of
relation (Grice 1989, 27).
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Stephen’s utterance. The former proposition, unlike the latter, provides Anita with sufficient
information to infer Stephen’s intended action and therefore disposes her to act in coordination
with it.
Communication will presumably also succeed if Anita entertains ∃!x(x is {beer ∩ in the
bungalow}∧x is cold)—a proposition Stephen doesn’t have the concepts to represent—so long
as the entertainment of this proposition disposes her to act in coordination with Stephen’s in-
tended action. Since act-coordinating intentions restrict proposition-types, Stephen needn’t
have the token propositions in mind which Anita could entertain in order to understand him.
Hence, on my proposed view, communication may succeed although there’s no overlap in the
propositions speaker and audience have in mind.
Presumably, if successful communication consists in part in the audience being disposed to
act in coordination with the speaker’s intended action, then communicative success will have de-
grees16. That’s because, presumably, acting in coordination with the speaker’s actions has degrees.
For instance, consider Stephen uttering ‘the beer is cold’ thereby intending Anita to entertain
a proposition of type ∃!x(x is {beer ∩ _} ∧ x is cold) and intending that the entertainment of
this proposition disposes her to act in coordination with his intended act of drinking Guinness
with her after the conference.
Now, if Anita were to entertain ∃!x(x is {beer∩ in the bungalow}∧x is cold) by his utter-
ance, then presumably communication wouldn’t be fully successful. That’s because, on the face
of it, the entertainment of ∃!x(x is {beer ∩ in the bungalow} ∧ x is cold) in context doesn’t
provide Anita with sufficient information to infer Stephen’s exact intended action. Presumably,
she’ll only expect, by entertaining the above proposition, that she might drink beer (but not
necessarily Guinness) with Stephen after the conference.
I think folk-intuitions support the idea that communicative success has degrees. We often
say things like ‘he didn’t understand me completely’ or ‘he roughly understood what I meant’.
My proposal explains such talk as follows: the propositionA entertained by S ’s utterance doesn’t
fully dispose A to act in coordination with S ’s intended action.
8 Conclusion
I have argued that, at least for definite descriptions, unarticulated indexical expressions don’t
pose a problem for Griceans. We can all be Gricean Russellians so long as the objects of com-
municative intentions are restricted proposition-types. The multiple-candidate problem merely
shows that sometimes speakers can’t communicatively intend discrete propositions by their ut-
16. Because speakers intended actions often seem vague—when S utters ‘the beer is cold’ it seems plausible
to think that it will be indeterminate whether S ’s intended action is (i) to potentially drink beer with A after
the conference or whether it is (ii) to potentially drink beer with A on the sofa after the conference,—a speaker’s
act-coordinating intention will presumably often be vague too.
I don’t think this vagueness is problematic, however. Some act-coordinating intentions may just be irredeemably
vague, such that it’s indeterminate whether communication was fully or partially successful.
32 APORIA Vol. 18 No. 2
terances.
I have argued that restricted proposition-types are proposition-types restricted by speaker’s
act-coordinating-intentions. This proposal explains how communication may succeed, although
the proposition the audience entertains by means of the speaker’s utterance is a proposition the
speaker doesn’t have the concepts to represent17.
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